

# WELLINGTON AND MASSÉNA IN SPAIN

## *Fuentes de Oñoro, Foz de Arouce and El Bodon 1811, historical notes*

### FOZ D'AROUCE, MARCH 15, 1811

March, 1811. Masséna's army had been in a defensive posture in the triangle Santarem-Thomar-Punhete for four months following its check before the Torres-Vedras lines. While awaiting Drouet d'Erlon's reinforcements and Soult's offensive, which was supposed to set out from Andalusia, the Army of Portugal had lived off the land as well as could be expected. Wellington had instituted a scorched earth strategy, and the French lines of communication were constantly being attacked and cut by Portuguese militia. Hence the imperial army's supply system was sustained by pillaging. Wearing by all these difficulties, lacking news from Soult and seeing d'Erlon arrive with only a single division, Masséna, without pay or supplies for his troops, decided to retreat in order to reconstitute his army.

On March 4, he discreetly retired in the direction of Leira and then Coïmbra. Ney and Montbrun were in the rear guard. A couple of engagements were fought during this phase of the retreat: Pombal (March 10) and Redinha (March 11). Coïmbra proved to be blocked off by militia and its bridge over the Mondego destroyed, and their troops were forced to turn to their right by Wellington's advance guard, so Ney and Masséna made the decision to abandon Coïmbra and retreat toward Celorico and the Spanish frontier. Flanking maneuvers around Condeixa (March 13) and Casal Novo (March 14) obliged Ney to retreat to Miranda de Corvo. After burning the town and abandoning their baggage to hasten their march, the French reached the valley of the Ceira River at Foz de Arouce. Then the II and VIII Corps crossed the bridge and established themselves on the heights overlooking the Ceira. Ney allowed only a portion of VI Corps to cross, in spite of the fact that Masséna had ordered him to ensure that everyone crossed and to destroy the bridge. The position was dangerous because the Ceira River was high and its fords were no longer usable; the only possible route of retreat passed over the ancient damaged bridge. The French had no advanced outposts, most of Lamotte's cavalry having fallen back without leaving pickets. Only Marchand's and Mermet's divisions and a few artillery pieces were left; they deployed in an arc around Foz de Arouce.

The Light Division and Picton's 3rd Division, delayed by fog and the burning of

Miranda de Corvo, finally arrived at 4 p.m. and camped in front of them. Wellington himself arrived only at nightfall. He decided to attempt a surprise attack, placing the Light Division on the left against Marchand and the 3rd Division on the right against Mermet. The attack took the French by surprise. Adding to the surprise, some companies of the 95th Rifles showed up at Foz de Arouce itself via a sunken road and threatened to capture the bridge. Hearing gunfire behind them near the bridge, with their colonel killed and believing that their line of retreat had been cut off, the 39th de Ligne was seized by panic and tried to flee across the bridge, but they were blocked by Lamotte's returning cavalry. The panicked infantrymen then tried to cross a ford farther downstream, but the water was too deep: some drowned, including the regimental standard-bearer; their eagle was later recovered by the British. Realizing that the situation was deteriorating, Ney put himself at the head of the 3rd Battalion of the 69th de Ligne and charged the 95th Rifles in Foz and repulsed them; they fell back on the 52nd Foot. With the bridge secured, the troops of the VI Corps were able to cross over to the north bank while under fire from artillery of both sides. The VIII Corps, stationed on the north bank of the river, dissuaded the British from pursuing them. By then it was midnight. At 3 a.m. the French blew up the bridge. After the combat at Foz, Wellington halted his hot pursuit and followed Masséna at a distance: it was now clear that the Army of Portugal was leaving Portugal for Spain, and in any case the Anglo-Portuguese had exhausted their provisions. Their advance guard nevertheless put the French II Corps in danger at Sabugal (29 March). On April 8, the Army of Portugal crossed the Spanish frontier. The third campaign in Portugal had drawn to a close.

Réda MIMOUNE

### FUENTES DE OÑORO, MAY 3 TO 5, 1811

The balance sheet for the past few months was indeed somber for the Army of Portugal and its commander-in-chief, Marshal Masséna. Dissension between the commander-in-chief and his subordinates had been incessant. By directing the war from Paris, neither Napoléon nor Berthier could react quickly enough to pacify them. After weeks of more than tumultuous relations, Masséna finally made a radical decision at 10 p.m. on March 22 (it would be commu-

nicated to the army the next day): the leader of the Army of Portugal dismissed Ney from his command and ordered him to return to the interior of Spain and place himself at the Emperor's disposal. Masséna named General Loison, the oldest of the divisional commanders, to head the VI Corps in place of the Marshal. However, in spite of the reaffirmation of his authority the situation hardly improved inside the French headquarters.

At the beginning of May he was frustrated: *"I am reduced to waiting—no longer for rescue but for my own and my army's destruction,"* he wrote to Berthier. On May 2, 1811, after Ciudad Rodrigo, Masséna finally resumed offensive operations, intending to relieve Almeida, which was currently menaced by Wellington. He started the campaign with several generals—including Drouet d'Erlon and Loison—having already announced their wish to leave his army. Moreover, Marshal Bessières, commander-in-chief of the northern army in Spain (based at Salamanca), and Marshal Soult in Andalusia had hardly made any effort to consult with him concerning the course of the upcoming operations. The French army advanced in three columns, II Corps on the right, VIII Corps in the center, and VI Corps, followed by IX Corps, on the left. On May 3, the French crossed the Agueda. Masséna soon discovered that Wellington's army barred his route. As was their custom, the Anglo-Portuguese had established themselves in a solid defensive position whose key was the village of Fuentes de Oñoro. Wellington's troops were positioned on sloping terrain which could not be turned via the south. The Côa river cut the plateau with a deep defile eight kilometers to the rear of the British line, constituting a possible disadvantage for Wellington if he had to execute a rapid retreat. The Anglo-Portuguese forces had increased to about 37,000 men and 48 guns (six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry). However, the French cavalry seems to have been superior to that of Wellington, thanks mainly to the inclusion of a brigade of Guard cavalry. Just as he had been at Bussaco, Masséna was determined to capture his adversary's fortified position. The impending battle would last for three days!

#### • May 3, 1811

Masséna's plan consisted in attempting a diversion to the north with II Corps so as to stretch the Anglo-Portuguese line before launching his main attack on Fuentes de

Oñoro. About 1 p.m. the French cavalry cleared the ground; then Ferey's division of VI Corps began the attack on the village. The French soldiers crossed the Dos Casas stream under enemy fire and succeeded in occupying the western part of Fuentes de Oñoro. Wellington ordered Colonel Henry Cardogan to launch a counterattack with elements of the 1st Division (1/71st, 1/79th and 2/24th). The village changed hands several times, but the Anglo-Portuguese had twice as many men and succeeded in repulsing the French. Masséna nevertheless launched a second attack around 5 p.m. that allowed him to reoccupy the lower part of the village. At nightfall, the Dos Casas stream marked the front line, with the Allies established to the west of it and the French to the east. During this first day, Masséna had engaged only a small part of his troops, but he had duplicated his error at Bussaco by obstinately persisting in frontal attacks. French losses were approximately 650 men as opposed to only 250 for the British side. During the course of the fighting, the soldiers of the Hanoverian Legion in French service, wearing red uniforms, were several times the victims of "friendly fire".

#### • May 4, 1811

Masséna next decided to change plans and push forward his cavalry to reconnoiter. During the morning, the two armies were content to exchange fire around Fuentes de Oñoro without attempting to widen the fighting. Upon their return, the French cavalry reported their discoveries to Masséna early in the afternoon. The Prince of Essling now began to formulate a new plan, for it was clear that victory could be attained only by turning Wellington's right (southern) wing, while at the same time fixing his entire line in place by other attacks. That evening Masséna redeployed his forces, reinforcing his left wing. Wellington meanwhile came to realize his own weakness. He sent his two cavalry brigades toward Nave de Haver to constitute a defensive screen in case of a French attack in that sector. He also sent Picton's and Spencer's divisions to his southern flank. The 7th Division was specifically ordered to defend Poco Velho.

#### • May 5, 1811

Both commanders-in-chief believed that this day would be decisive. Masséna hurled his troops forward at break of day. The French plan started with a powerful cavalry attack in the south, between Nave de Haver and Poco Velho. The British cavalry, the 16th Light Dragoons and 1st KGL Hussars, was quickly defeated by Montbrun's cavalry, particularly Fournier's brigade. About 7 a.m., Marchand's and Mermet's infantry divisions exploited the French cavalry's success and put the British 7th Division under pressure. Realizing that his right wing was threatened, Wellington formed a second line of defense from Fuentes de Oñoro toward Freinada with Craufurd's Light Division and Spencer's 1st Division. The Bri-

tish cavalry, greatly inferior in numbers, continued to retreat.

During this time, IX Corps began its attack in the center, with the goal of capturing the village of Fuentes de Oñoro. The plan of a "rolling attack" from left to right now seemed to be developing perfectly. Ferey attacked first. He was relieved at 10 a.m. by Claparède's and Conroux's divisions. The French pushed back the British forces and cleared the village from end to end. The 9th Regiment of light infantry was first to reach the church.

At that point, a French victory seemed within reach. Masséna hoped to nail down the victory and give fresh impetus to his attack on the southern flank, where Montbrun's cavalry was now assaulting Craufurd's troops. Therefore he gave General Lepic orders to engage his cavalry brigade of the Imperial Guard in support of Montbrun. The young Oudinot brought Lepic's response to Masséna: "*The Guard only recognizes the Duke of Istria and cannot draw sword without his order.*" Bessières was sought in vain; he could not be found, and Masséna, exasperated, could only watch the result: the Anglo-Portuguese troops were able to retire in good order, extricated from the pressure of the exhausted French cavalry.

What was worse, Wellington profited from this circumstance by counterattacking Fuentes de Oñoro at midday. Picton's men, with Mackinnon's brigade at their head, began by attempting to dislodge the French from the village by a bayonet assault. Once again the fighting was furious. By 2 p.m. the greater part of Fuentes de Oñoro was once more under British control. Even then Masséna was still not discouraged, but prepared a new attack. It took news from General Eblé that the munitions were running low to force him to abandon his intent. The fighting ceased before nightfall. The French spent the night on the field of battle, but they had allowed a significant victory to slip through their fingers.

Numerous striking deeds had marked the day. For example, Fournier's cavalry brigade had broken two squares from Craufurd's division, and Montbrun's dragoons had dispersed a third. Earlier in the day, and in the same sector, Lieutenant Ramsay had succeeded in saving two cannons of Bull's horse artillery battery by "charging" with its crew right through the middle of the French cavalry. Losses were heavy on both sides, especially due to the horrific fighting in the village of Fuentes de Oñoro: 2,192 lost by the French (267 killed, 1,878 wounded and 47 prisoners); 1,452 lost by the Anglo-Portuguese (192 killed, 958 wounded and 225 prisoners).

On May 10, at Ciudad Rodrigo, Masséna received the Emperor's letter relieving him of command in favor of Marshal Marmont. The same day Almeida's garrison, commanded by General Brenier, destroyed its ramparts and its arsenal and broke through the British lines to join the rest of the French forces, thus depriving Wellington of the artillery in the city. The duel between the

Iron Duke and the Prince of Essling had ended with this indecisive battle. Masséna had not recovered Portugal, but neither had Wellington entered Spain.

### FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE AT FUENTES DE OÑORO, MAY 3-5, 1811

#### Armée du Portugal, maréchal Masséna, prince d'Essling

##### • II<sup>e</sup> corps d'armée, général de division Reynier

1<sup>re</sup> division, général de division Merle  
 1<sup>re</sup> brigade, général de brigade Sarrut  
 2<sup>e</sup> Léger (1482)  
 36<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1269)  
 2<sup>e</sup> brigade, général de brigade Graindorge  
 4<sup>e</sup> Léger (1365)  
 2<sup>e</sup> division, général de division Heudelet  
 1<sup>re</sup> brigade, général de brigade Godard  
 17<sup>e</sup> Léger (1010)  
 70<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1311)  
 2<sup>e</sup> brigade, général de brigade Arnaud  
 31<sup>e</sup> Léger (1781)  
 47<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1616)  
 Artillerie, Colonel Fontenay  
 8 pièces d'artillerie

##### • VI<sup>e</sup> corps d'armée, général de division Loison

1<sup>re</sup> division, général de division Marchand  
 1<sup>re</sup> brigade, général de brigade Maucune  
 6<sup>e</sup> Léger (1120)  
 69<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1209)  
 2<sup>e</sup> brigade, général de brigade Marcognet  
 39<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1063)  
 76<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1405)  
 2<sup>e</sup> division, général de division Mermet  
 1<sup>re</sup> brigade, général de brigade Labassée  
 25<sup>e</sup> Léger (1393)  
 27<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1425)  
 2<sup>e</sup> brigade, général de brigade Bardet  
 50<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1212)  
 59<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1550)  
 3<sup>e</sup> division, général de brigade Ferey  
 1<sup>re</sup> brigade, général de brigade Simon  
 32<sup>e</sup> Léger (131)  
 82<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (863)  
 Légion du Midi (175)  
 Légion hanovrienne (307)  
 2<sup>e</sup> brigade, général de brigade Ferey  
 26<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (616)  
 66<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (804)  
 Brigade de cavalerie légère, général de brigade Lamotte (175)  
 3<sup>e</sup> de Hussards (119)  
 15<sup>e</sup> de Chasseurs à cheval (186)  
 Artillerie, général de brigade Charbonnel  
 12 pièces d'artillerie

##### • VIII<sup>e</sup> Corps d'armée, général de division Junot

2<sup>e</sup> division, général de division Solignac  
 1<sup>re</sup> brigade, général de brigade Gratien  
 15<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (846)  
 65<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1483)  
 2<sup>e</sup> brigade, général de brigade Thomières  
 86<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (1263)

Régiment irlandais (273)  
 Artillerie  
 4 pièces d'artillerie

• **IX<sup>e</sup> Corps d'armée, général de division Drouet d'Erlon**

1<sup>re</sup> division, général de division Claparède (général de brigade Vichery)

1<sup>re</sup> brigade  
 2<sup>e</sup> demi-brigade légère provisoire  
 54<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (520)  
 21<sup>e</sup> Léger (601)  
 28<sup>e</sup> Léger (503)  
 7<sup>e</sup> demi-brigade provisoire, colonel Bonnaire

40<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (475)  
 63<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (397)  
 88<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (605)  
 8<sup>e</sup> demi-brigade provisoire  
 64<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (520)  
 100<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (411)  
 103<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (604)

2<sup>e</sup> division, général de division Conroux (général de brigade Gérard)

1<sup>re</sup> brigade  
 3<sup>e</sup> demi-brigade légère provisoire  
 9<sup>e</sup> Léger (595)  
 16<sup>e</sup> Léger (603)  
 27<sup>e</sup> Léger -

2<sup>e</sup> brigade  
 1<sup>re</sup> demi-brigade provisoire, colonel Chabert

8<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (681)  
 24<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (597)  
 45<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (391)  
 2<sup>e</sup> demi-brigade provisoire, colonel Aulard  
 94<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (608)  
 95<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (579)  
 96<sup>e</sup> de Ligne (481)

Artillerie  
 6 pièces d'artillerie

• **Réserve de cavalerie, général de division Montbrun**

1<sup>re</sup> brigade, général de brigade Lorcet  
 3<sup>e</sup> de Dragons (101)  
 6<sup>e</sup> de Dragons (359)  
 2<sup>e</sup> brigade, général de brigade Cavrois  
 10<sup>e</sup> de Dragons (224)  
 11<sup>e</sup> de Dragons (346)  
 3<sup>e</sup> brigade, colonel d'Ornano  
 15<sup>e</sup> de Dragons (462)  
 25<sup>e</sup> de Dragons (542)

Brigade de cavalerie, général de brigade Fournier (détachée du IX<sup>e</sup> corps)

7<sup>e</sup> de Chasseurs à cheval (282)  
 13<sup>e</sup> de Chasseurs à cheval (270)  
 20<sup>e</sup> de Chasseurs à cheval (242)

Artillerie  
 6 pièces d'artillerie

**Armée du Nord, maréchal Bessières, duc d'Istrie**

Brigade de cavalerie de la garde impériale, général de brigade Lepic (881)

Mamelouks (79)  
 Chasseurs à cheval (235)  
 Grenadiers à cheval (197)  
 Cheval-Légers-Lanciers (370)

Brigade de cavalerie légère, général de brigade Watier (784)

5<sup>e</sup> de Hussards (172)  
 11<sup>e</sup> de Chasseurs à cheval (231)  
 12<sup>e</sup> de Chasseurs à cheval (181)  
 24<sup>e</sup> de Chasseurs à cheval (200)

Artillerie  
 6 pièces d'artillerie

**ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ORDER OF BATTLE AT FUENTES DE OÑORO, MAY 3-5, 1811**

• **Anglo-Portuguese Army, Lieutenant-General Arthur Viscount Wellington**

Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton (1 854 men)

1st Brigade, Major-General Slade  
 1st Dragoons (388)  
 14th Light Dragoons (378)  
 2nd Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel F. van Arentschildt  
 16th Light Dragoon (362)  
 1st KGL Hussars (414)  
 3rd Brigade, Brigadier-General de Barbacena  
 Cavalaria 4 (104)  
 Cavalaria 10 (208)

1st Division, Lieutenant-General Sir Brent Spencer (7 565 men)

1st Brigade, Colonel E. Stopford  
 1/2nd Coldstream Guards (940)  
 1/3rd Scots Guards (959)  
 5/60th Foot (1 compagnie, 44)  
 2nd Brigade, Major-General M. Nightingall

II/24th Foot (371)  
 I/42nd Foot, the Black Watch (445)  
 I/79th Foot (922)  
 5/60th Foot (1 compagnie, 36)  
 3rd Brigade, Major-General Howard  
 I/50th Foot (597)  
 I/71st Foot (497)  
 I/92nd Foot (764)  
 3/95th Foot (1 compagnie, 76)

4th Brigade, Major-General Baron von Löwe

1st KGL Line Battalion (512)  
 2nd KGL Line Battalion (484)  
 5th KGL Line Battalion (422)  
 7th KGL Line Battalion (410)  
 KGL Light Companies (2 compagnies, 86)

3rd Division, Major-General Thomas Picton (5 480 men)

1st Brigade, Colonel Henry Mackinnon  
 1/45th Foot (508)  
 74th Foot (485)  
 I/88th Foot (467)  
 5/60th Foot (3 compagnies, 183)

2nd Brigade Major-General Charles Colville

II/5th Foot (504)  
 II/83rd Foot (460)  
 II/88th Foot (437)  
 94th Foot (536)

3rd Portuguese Brigade, Colonel Manly Power

Infantaria 9 (910)  
 Infantaria 21 (740)  
 5th Division, Major-General Sir William Erskine (5 158 men)

1st Brigade, Brigadier-General Andrew Hay

III/1st Foot (672)  
 I/9th Foot (599)  
 I/38th Foot (402)  
 Brunswick-Oels (1 compagnie, 69)  
 2nd Brigade, Major-General Dunlop  
 I/4th Foot (612)  
 II/30th Foot (507)  
 II/44th Foot (437)  
 Brunswick-Oels (1 compagnie 68)  
 3rd Portuguese Brigade, Brigadier-General William Spry  
 Infantaria 3 (724)  
 Infantaria 15 (556)  
 Caçadores 8 (484)

6th Division, Major-General Alexander Campbell (4 692 men)

1st Brigade, Colonel Hulse  
 I/11th Foot (837)  
 II/53rd Foot (459)  
 I/61st Foot (697)  
 5/60th Foot (1 compagnie 48)  
 2nd Brigade, Colonel Burne  
 I/36th Foot (514)  
 3rd Portuguese Brigade, Colonel Madden  
 Infantaria 8 (915)  
 Infantaria 12 (1 222)

7th Division, Major-General William Houston

1st Brigade, Major-General Sontag  
 II/51st Foot (590)  
 85th Foot (387)  
 Chasseurs Britanniques (839)  
 Brunswick-Oels (8 compagnies, 593)  
 2nd Portuguese Brigade, Brigadier-General Doyle  
 Infantaria 7 (713)  
 Infantaria 19 (1 026)  
 Caçadores 2 (442)

Light Division: Major-General Robert Craufurd (3 815 men)

1st Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel T.S. Beckwith

I/43rd Foot (754)  
 I/95th (4 compagnies, 354)  
 II/95th Foot (1 compagnie 76)  
 Caçadores 3 (447)  
 2nd Brigade, Colonel G. Drummond  
 I/52nd Foot (835)  
 II/52nd Foot (542)  
 I/95th Foot (4 compagnies 357)  
 Caçadores 1 (450)

Independent Portuguese Brigade, Colonel Charles Ashworth (2 359 men)

Infantaria 6 (986)  
 Infantaria 18 (1 130)  
 Caçadores 6 (423)

Artillery

Royal Horse Artillery (167)  
 Bull (5 6pdrs & I howitzer)  
 Ross (5 6pdrs & I howitzer)  
 Foot Artillery (270)  
 R. Lawson (5 9pdrs & I howitzer)  
 G. Thompson (5 light 6pdrs & I howitzer)

Portuguese Artillery (550)  
 Sequerra  
 Cunha Preto  
 Rozieres  
 Rosado  
 Ingénieurs (40)  
 Train (226)

Independent Portuguese Brigade, Pack  
 blockading Almeida  
 Infantaria 1  
 Infantaria 16  
 Caçadores 4  
 2nd Foot (558), detached from Burne's  
 brigade of 6th division

Frédéric BEY

## EL BODON, SEPTEMBER 25, 1811

By September 1811, Marmont had already succeeded Masséna as commander of the Army of Portugal several months previously. Since his installation in command, there had been no serious encounters with Wellington's troops. The latter began the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo (a Spanish fortress on the Portuguese frontier) on September 5, 1811. Informed of this, Marmont sent part of his army to succor the place. This force was joined there by the Army of the North, whose new commander was General Dorsenne. Almost 55,000 men strong (including 5,000 cavalry), the French army had no difficulty in chasing off the Anglo-Portuguese forces encircling the city. Forced to fall back, the allied troops were not then in the best of positions to engage in battle. Marmont decided to send forward his cavalry in pursuit of the Anglo-Portuguese. A battle took place about fifteen kilometers from Ciudad Rodrigo between the French forces, led by General Montbrun, and General Picton's 3rd British Division. The latter had dispersed his men over more than fifteen kilometers, and it was not possible to reassemble them before the French attack, which appeared imminent. About midday on September 25, 1811, Montbrun's cavalry began arriving in the vicinity of the village of El Bodon, where Picton had stationed five squadrons of cavalry and two brigades of infantry. One of the brigades was deployed at El Bodon, while the other, led by Major Colville, was about three kilometers farther north, on high ground and covered by the Portuguese artillery. Another brigade was too far away to intervene. Picton, realizing the danger to the brigade stationed at El Bodon, ordered it to fall back toward Fuenteguinaldo. He hastened forward with his other brigade, supported by Major Alten's cavalry, to facilitate the retreat. This brigade consisted of about 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Meanwhile, the leading French cavalymen attacked two artillery batteries and captured four cannons. The allied cavalry counter-charged them several times, enabling the infantry to withdraw.

The difficulty of the terrain allowed the allied units to escape without too much damage, but it took all the British infantry's

tenacity to accomplish that perilous mission; they had to form square repeatedly in response to French charges. A second wave of French cavalry, and then a third, launched attacks against them. In spite of their resulting losses, the British troops, joined by a Portuguese regiment (the 21st, 800 strong), succeeded in getting away. Several kilometers from Fuenteguinaldo they finally managed to join up with the brigade that had retreated from El Bodon. At length, the rest of Picton's division reunited with the retreating force, though harassed by continued fighting for several hours, and reached the city. Wellington, sensing the danger, had already sent an additional brigade from the 4th Division in support. In all, on each side about 200 men were killed or wounded. It was clearly a French victory since Montbrun's 2,500 cavalry were masters of the field at the end of the day. However, this victory would remain without significance, because the strategic objective had not been attained: the brilliant fighting by the French dragoons and light cavalry did not result in the capture of Fuenteguinaldo, which would have been a heavy blow to the Anglo-Portuguese troops. Thiebault's division of 4,000 men only arrived on the battlefield at day's end. It was already too late.

Sauveur D'ANNA

## SCÉNARIOS

### A2. Foz d'Arouce March 15, 1811 (What if?)

Marshal Ney, exasperated by Marshal Masséna's bearing and his orders, decides to halt his retreat and attempt a counterattack: disgrace or glory! In reaction, Wellington brings up, by forced march, the two reserve divisions that were some distance away. This would no longer be a simple engagement with the rear guard, but a genuine battle.

#### • Duration

The scenario starts on March 15, 1811, with Turn 1 (1700) and lasts 4 turns, through Turn 4 (2300). Turns 2, 3 and 4 are night turns.

#### • Victory conditions

**Victory at the end of the game:** Victory is awarded to the player who scores at least 7 more points than his opponent. If the difference between the points scored by the two sides is 6 or less, the game is a draw.

Victory points are scored as follows:

#### **French and Anglo-Portuguese:**

2 VP per enemy infantry, cavalry or artillery unit eliminated;

1 VP per routed enemy unit still on the map at the end of the game;

**Hex control:** 1 VP for control of each of the 10 village hexes at the end of the game (i.e., 10 VP maximum). Control means to occupy or be the last to have passed through the hex in question. At the start of the scenario, 2 hexes (1414 and 1416) are controlled by the Anglo-Portuguese player and 2 hexes (0908 and 1107) by the French player. The other 6 are not controlled by either side.

#### • Initiative

The French player automatically has the strategic initiative on the first turn.

#### • Retreat direction

**Anglo-Portuguese:** toward the south edge of the map (hexrow xx20).

**French:** toward the right bank of the Ceira by crossing the bridge, or, for cavalry units only, by crossing the ford (see specific rules regarding 10.4 Rout movement).

#### Initial deployment

Deployment is identical to that of the historical scenario with respect to units on the map, except that all units listed as disordered in A1. are in good order.

#### French:

9 AMs available: 2 AMs MARCHAND, 2 AMs MERMET, 2 AMs LAMOTTE, 2 AMs FERREY and 1 AM SOLIGNAC

#### Anglo-Portuguese:

8 AMs available: 2 AMs PICTON, 2 AMs CRAUFORD, 1 AM INDEPENDENT, 1 AM ARTILLERY, 1 AM SPENCER and 1 AM CAMPBELL

*Note: The CAM Panique is not available for this scenario.*

#### • Reinforcements

**Turn 1 (1700):** French, Formation SOLIGNAC, 15<sup>e</sup> de Ligne, 65<sup>e</sup> de Ligne, 86<sup>e</sup> de Ligne, Régiment irlandais and Artillery Solignac in 1101; Anglo-Portuguese: Formation ARTILLERY, Ross and Bull in 1518; Formation INDEPENDENT, Infantaria 1, Infantaria 16 and Caçadores 4 in 0108 (**Historical note:** this constitutes the 1st Brigade, from Lisbon); Formation SPENCER, Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards, Nightingall, Howard and von Lowe in 0719; Formation CAMPBELL, Hulse, Burne, Infantaria 8 and Infantaria 12 in 0320.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

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**Turn 2** (1900): French: 2nd AM SOLIGNAC

Anglo-Portuguese: 2nd AM ARTILLERY, 2nd AM INDEPENDENT, 2nd AM SPENCER, 2nd AM CAMPBELL and 1st AM STAPLETON-COTTON; Formation STAPLETON-COTTON, 16th Light Dragoons and 1st KGL Hussars in 0320, 1st Dragoons and 14th Light Dragoons in 1518.

**Turn 3** (2100): Anglo-Portuguese: 2nd AM STAPLETON-COTTON

## **C2. EL BODÓN SEPTEMBER 25, 1811 (WHAT IF?)**

This hypothetical scenario explores what would have happened if Thiebaut's Division (of the Armée du Nord) had arrived in time to support Montbrun. Alerted, Picton has succeeded in concentrating his entire division and has no intention of leaving the door open to the French troops.

### • Duration

The scenario starts on September 25, 1811, with Turn 1 (1000) and lasts 5 turns, through Turn 5 (1800).

### • Victory conditions

**Victory at the end of the game:** Victory is awarded to the player who scores at least 7 more points than his opponent. If the difference between the points scored by the two sides is 6 or less, the game is a draw.

Victory points are scored as follows:

#### **French and Anglo-Portuguese:**

2 VP per enemy infantry, cavalry or artillery unit eliminated;

1 VP per routed enemy unit still on the map at the end of the game;

2 VP for control of hex 1106 at the end of the game. Control means to occupy or be the last to pass through the hex in question.

### • Initiative

The French player automatically has the strategic initiative on the first turn.

### • Retreat direction

**Anglo-Portuguese:** toward the south edge of the map (hexrow xx20).

**French:** toward the north edge of the map (hexrow xx01).

### • Initial deployment

#### **French:**

4 AMs available: 1 AM MONTBRUN, 1 AM LAMOTTE, 1 AM D'ERLON (see specific rule) and 1 AM ARMÉE DU NORD

**Montbrun** 0101

#### **Anglo-Portuguese:**

2 AMs available: 1 AM PICTON and 1 AM STAPLETON-COTTON

**Picton** 1106

PICTON

5th Foot and Preto 0407

77th Foot and Sequeira 0507

Infanteria 21 1215

(with a reinforcement marker)

45th Foot 1106

I/88th Foot and II/ 88th Foot 1205

STAPLETON-COTTON

11th Light Dragoons 0208

1st KGL Hussars 0309

### • Reinforcements

Reinforcements enter in the order desired by the two players.

**Turn 1** (1000): French: Formation MONTBRUN, 3<sup>e</sup>/6<sup>e</sup> Dragons, 10<sup>e</sup>/11<sup>e</sup> Dragons, 15<sup>e</sup>/25<sup>e</sup> Dragons et artillerie Montbrun; Formation LAMOTTE, 3<sup>e</sup> Hussards et 15<sup>e</sup> Chasseurs; Formation D'ERLON (Fournier, cavalerie du IX<sup>e</sup> corps), 7<sup>e</sup> Chasseurs, 13<sup>e</sup> Chasseurs et 20<sup>e</sup> Chasseurs; Formation ARMÉE DU NORD, 34<sup>e</sup> Léger, 113<sup>e</sup> de Ligne, 4<sup>e</sup> Vistule, Neuchâtel and artillery Armée du Nord in 0101. (Historical note: This constitutes Thiebaut's Division).

**Turn 2** (1200): French: 2nd AM MONTBRUN, 2nd AM LAMOTTE, 2nd AM D'ERLON, 2nd AM ARMÉE DU NORD.

Anglo-Portuguese: 2nd AM PICTON and 2nd AM STAPLETON-COTTON, Formation PICTON, 83rd Foot, 94th Foot and Infanteria 9 in 0110.

## **Masséna and Wellington in Spain (Foz d'Arouce, Fuentes de Oñoro and El Bodón 1811) :**

Publisher: VaeVictis Collection Jeux d'Histoire 2011

Map and counter graphics: Pascal Da Silva

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Website : [www.fredbey.com](http://www.fredbey.com) on the « série Jours de Gloire » page.

Official discussion and support forums : in french at [www.lestafette.net](http://www.lestafette.net) and in english at [www.consimworld.com](http://www.consimworld.com)

To review or comment on the game : <http://www.boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/108430/fuentes-de-onoro-1811>

Facebook Page of VaeVictis and Trophée du Bicentenaire: select : « VaeVictis, le magazine du jeu d'histoire » or « Trophée du Bicentenaire » sur [www.facebook.com](http://www.facebook.com)